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Abstract
We consider, within the framework of inductive inference, the concept of refuting learning
as introduced by Mukouchi and Arikawa, where the learner is not only required to learn all
concepts in a given class but also has to explicitly refute concepts outside the class.
In the 1rst part of the paper, we consider learning from text and introduce a concept of
limit-refuting learning that is intermediate between refuting learning and reliable learning. We
give characterizations for these concepts and show some results about their relative strength and
their relation to con1dent learning.
In the second part of the paper we consider learning from texts that for some k contain all
positive k -formulae that are valid in the standard structure determined by the set to be learned.
In this model, the following results are shown. For the language with successor, any countable
axiomatizable class can be limit-refuting learned from 1-texts. For the language with successor
and order, any countable axiomatizable class can be reliably learned from 1-texts and can be
limit-refuting learned from 2-texts, whereas the axiomatizable class of all 1nite sets cannot
be limit-refuting learned from 1-texts. For the full language of arithmetic, which contains in
addition plus and times, for any even k there is an axiomatizable class that can be limit-refuting
learned from k+1-texts but not from k -texts. A similar result with k + 3 in place of k + 1
holds with respect to the language of Presburger’s arithmetic.
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1. Introduction
Inductive Inference [12,25] studies, on an abstract level, the phenomenon of learn-
ing. Gold [7] introduced the following basic formalization of a learning situation. The
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objects to be learned are the sets within a given class of recursively enumerable sets.
The learner has to identify each set in this class by converging to a hypothesis that
describes the set uniquely while observing longer and longer pre1xes of any text for
this set. A learner converges if it changes its hypothesis at most 1nitely often, a text
for a set is any sequence that contains all elements but no non-elements of the set,
and usually hypotheses are indices with respect to some 1xed acceptable numbering
of the partial recursive functions (equivalently one could use grammars or programs
enumerating the members of the set to be learned).
Gold [7] demonstrated that it is impossible to learn the class of all recursively enu-
merable sets. This restriction holds for topological as well as for recursion theoretical
reasons:
(a) For any learner that learns all 1nite sets and for any in1nite set A, there is a text
for A on which the learner diverges.
(b) The class of all graphs of computable functions cannot be learned by a computable
learner—indeed, Adleman and Blum [1] quanti1ed the problem of learning this
class by showing that learning the class requires access to an oracle of high Turing
degree.
The topological and computational aspects of learning interact. Gold [7] considered
models of learning where in place of arbitrary texts, the learner just receives texts that
can be computed in some 1xed computation model. Gold showed that a computable
learner can learn all recursively enumerable sets from primitive recursive texts (by
simply identifying the primitive recursive function that generates the text) while, on
the other hand, the collection of all recursive texts is already so complex that a com-
putable learner cannot learn the class of all recursively enumerable sets from recursive
texts.
In the present work, the power of learners is not enlarged by restricting texts to
computationally simple ones but by increasing their information content. While standard
texts essentially just list the elements of the set to be learned, we consider texts that
contain positive formulae that are true for the set to be learned. The consideration of
such more informative texts relates to the fact that we consider a model of learning
where the learner has to recognize and to explicitly refute data-sequences belonging
to sets that are not learned. This model is rather restrictive in a setting of standard
texts and allows just the learning of classes of 1nite sets. The model becomes more
powerful in the setting where the texts contain formulae and in this setting, we will
investigate into the question which kind of classes can be learned from what types of
formulae.
Mukouchi and Arikawa [22,23] introduced the learning model where the learner has
to refute data-sequences that belong to sets that are not in the class to be learned. Their
model is a sharpened version of Minicozzi’s reliable learning, where the learner either
converges to a correct index or diverges. In the model of Mukouchi and Arikawa,
instead of diverging, the learner has to give an explicit refutation signal after a 1nite
number of steps.
Lange and Watson [17], Jantke [14], and Jain [10] considered variants of refuting
learning where a learner M for a class C of sets is not required to refute unless the
input text T satis1es both of the following conditions:
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• M does not infer the concept to which T belongs.
• There is a pre1x 4T such that no data-sequence of any concept in C ex-
tends .
These restrictions where tried to overcome the observation that the original de1nition
of “refutable learning” of Mukouchi and Arikawa [22,23] where rather restrictive. In
particular, the original conditions permitted only to learn 1nite sets since, on the one
hand, a learner cannot learn an in1nite set A and all its subsets and, on the other hand,
a refuting learner cannot refute any subset of a set it learns.
The present work takes an alternative approach to improve the power of a refuting
learner. First, we consider a model where the learner is only required to “refute in the
limit”. In a context of language learning from informant, a similar concept has been
introduced recently and independently by Jain et al. [11]. In a context of function-
learning, already Grieser [8,9] investigated learners that refute in the limit. In his
model of reKecting learning, however, a function f has only to be refuted in case it
is incompatible with the class to be learned, i.e., if there is a pre1x 4f that is not
extended by any function in the class to be learned. Grieser [8,9] notes that with his
model in many (but not all) cases the necessity to refute can be avoided by transition
to a dense superclass C′ of the class C to be learned because by de1nition, C′ is
learnable with reKection in the limit iL C′ is learnable in the limit with respect to the
standard de1nition of learning.
Second, more powerful variants of texts will be considered in order to overcome
the restriction to classes of 1nite sets. This is achieved by considering a slightly al-
tered form of the logical-based setting originally considered by Mukouchi and Arikawa
[22,23]. Informally, our approach can be summarized as follows:
• The learner either has to converge to an index of the set to be learned or to the
distinguished refutation symbol “?”. It will be shown in Remark 3.5 that this type of
learning is more restrictive than reliable learning but is less restrictive than the model
used by Mukouchi and Arikawa, where the data is already refuted by outputting a
single refutation symbol.
• The data-sequences are sequences of 1rst-order sentences describing the set to be
learned. In the special case where the data just contains the atomic facts that hold
for the set to be learned, this is equivalent to presenting a standard text for the
set. We will, however, also consider models where the data does not just contain
atomic sentences but k -sentences of some given level k in the quanti1er alternation
hierarchy.
For more detailed accounts of inductive inference, inference in logic, and recursion
theory in general we refer the reader to the cited monographs [3,12,19,24,30].
Notation: For an arbitrary set A, let A∗ be the set of 1nite strings over A. We write
N for the set of natural numbers. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, by the terms set
and class we refer to a set of natural numbers and to a set of such sets, respectively.
We 1x a canonical indexing of the 1nite sets and we let Fi denote the 1nite set with
canonical index i. A class C of 1nite sets is computable (is recursively enumerable) iL
the set {i: Fi∈C} is computable (is recursively enumerable). Observe that a non-empty
class of 1nite sets is recursively enumerable iL it can be represented as {Fg(i): i∈N}
for some recursive function g.
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2. Learning from standard texts
Before we discuss refuting learning in Section 3, we shortly review some basic
concepts and techniques from learning theory. Related to the task of refuting input
texts, the learners considered in the following do not just output indices (i.e., natural
numbers) but might also output a special refutation symbol.
We 1x two distinguished symbols not in N, the pause symbol # and the refutation
symbol ?. Texts and strings are in1nite and 1nite, respectively, sequences over N∪{#}.
The range of a text or string is the set of all elements appearing in it that are diLerent
from the pause symbol. We write range() for the range of a string . A text is a text
for a set A iL A coincides with the range of this text and hence, for example, ## : : : is
the only text for the empty set.
Denition 2.1. An unrestricted learner is a mapping from strings to N∪{?} and a
learner is such a mapping that is computable. A learner EX-learns or, for short, learns
a set A iL on every text for A, the learner converges to an index for A. A learner
learns a class iL it learns every set in the class.
Remark 2.2. The numbers output by a learner are meant as hypothesis on the set
to be learned with respect to some 1xed indexing. In this connection, the usage of
computable and of recursively enumerable indices is most common, i.e., the number
i denotes the ith partial recursive function and the ith recursively enumerable set Wi,
respectively. In the sequel we will frequently consider the learning of classes of 1nite
sets, and in this situation we might also use canonical indices as hypotheses.
Most of the results shown below will go through if we simply require that the sets
to be learned can be identi1ed by an index at all and that there is an eLective mapping
that maps some natural description of sets emerging from the learning algorithm to
indices of these sets with respect to the indexing used. In fact, we will not presuppose
more on the indexing used unless explicitly stated otherwise.
In a context of learners that always output a natural number, Osherson et al. [25]
considered learners that converge on all texts.
Denition 2.3 (Osherson [25, Section 4.6.2]). A learner is con8dent iL on any text,
the learner converges to a natural number. A class is con8dently learnable iL it is
learned by a con1dent learner.
Standard techniques and results for con1dent learners extend easily to the type of
learners considered here, which besides natural numbers might also output refutation
symbol, if we require again that the learner has to converge—to an index or to the
refutation symbol—on all texts.
Remark 2.4. Any class that is learned by a learner that converges on all texts does
not contain in1nite ascending chains. In particular, the class of all 1nite sets cannot be
learned by such a learner.
For a proof by contradiction, 1x a learner M that converges on all texts and consider
an ascending chain A0; A1; : : : of sets that are all learned by M . Then one can inductively
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1nd strings k such that each k contains only elements from Ak and M outputs an
index for Ak on input 01 : : : k . So M outputs on the text 01 : : : an index for each
of the sets Ak and hence does not converge, neither to an index for a set nor to the
refutation symbol. Note that this proof does not require that 01 : : : is indeed a text
for the set A0∪A1∪ : : : ; it may also be a text for a proper subset.
Remark 2.5. Let M0 be a learner that converges on all texts. Then for any set A there
is a string  over A∪{#} that is a stabilizing sequence for M0 and A in the sense
that for all strings  over A∪{#} we have M0()=M0(). For a proof observe that,
otherwise, we could construct a text for A on which M0 diverges.
By searching for such stabilizing sequences we can construct a learner M that learns
all sets that are learned by M0 and has in addition the following properties (for details
of this construction see Jain et al. [12, Proposition 5.29, p. 102]). First, for any set
A—including sets that are not learned or are not even indexed by the given indexing—
the learner M converges on every text of A to the same value M0(), where  is the
least stabilizing sequence for M0 and A (with respect to some appropriate ordering on
strings). Second, any text for any set A has a 1nite pre1x that is a stabilizing sequence
for M and A.
3. Refuting learning from standard texts
Next we review the de1nitions of the concepts of refuting and reliable learning
that are due to Mukouchi and Arikawa [22] and to Minicozzi [21], respectively, and
we introduce the related concept of limit-refuting learning. While a refuting learner
continues forever to output refutation symbols after having output a refutation symbol
once, a limit-refuting learner might alternate between indices and refutation symbols
in an arbitrary way before converging.
Denition 3.1. A learner refutes a set iL on every text for this set, the learner 1rst
outputs at most 1nitely many numbers (without outputting any refutation symbol) and
then outputs nothing but refutation symbols. A learner is refuting iL for any set A,
either the learner refutes A or on every text for A the learner converges to an index
for A without ever outputting ?. A learner limit-refutes a set iL on every text for
this set, the learner converges to ? and a learner is limit-refuting if it either learns or
limit-refutes any set.
A class C is refuting learnable iL there is a refuting learner that learns C. A class
C is sharply refuting learnable iL there is a refuting learner that learns C and refutes
every set not in C. The concept limit-refuting learnable and its sharp variant are
de1ned likewise with refuting replaced by limit-refuting.
A learner is reliable iL for any set A, the learner either learns A or has in1nitely
many mind changes on any text for A, and a class is reliably learnable if it is learned
by a reliable learner.
The sharply refuting learnable classes are those originally introduced by Mukouchi
and Arikawa [22,23]. Observe that a class is refuting learnable iL it is a subclass of
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some sharply refuting learnable class. This follows because by de1nition any refuting
class is a subclass of a sharply refuting class while, on the other hand, any sharply
refuting learnable class is refuting learnable and any subclass of a refuting learnable
class is again refuting learnable.
In Remarks 3.2–3.4, we describe some features of the types of learning described in
De1nition 3.1 and then, in Remark 3.5, we compare their respective strength.
Remark 3.2. For the scope of this remark, call a class in8nitely-often-refuting learn-
able iL the class is learned by a learner that for any set A, either learns A or outputs
in1nitely many refutation symbols on any text for A. By de1nition, any limit-refuting
learnable class is also in1nitely-often-refuting learnable. Moreover, the concepts of
in1nitely-often-refuting learning and of reliable learning coincide. In fact, any in1nitely-
often-refuting learner can be transformed into a reliable learner that learns the same
class by simply replacing each refutation symbol by an index that has not been output
on the same text before. Conversely, every reliable learner can be transformed into
an in1nitely-often-refuting learner for the same class by outputting a refutation symbol
each time before switching to a new index.
Remark 3.3. A class of sets is reliably learnable if and only if it consists only of 1nite
sets. In particular, by Remark 3.5 below, any refuting or limit-refuting learnable class
consists only of 1nite sets.
The restriction of reliable learning to classes of 1nite sets has already been observed
by Osherson et al. [25, Proposition 4.6.1A] and can be shown as follows. A learner
that always outputs an index for the 1nite set seen so far learns all 1nite sets and is
indeed reliable. Next assume that M is a reliable learner and let a1a2 : : : be any text for
an in1nite set A. Then each set of the form {a1; : : : ; am} is either learned by M or M
diverges on any text for this set and consequently there must be in1nitely many sets
of the former or in1nitely many sets of the latter type. But in both cases, by simply
repeating elements in the given text, we can construct a text for A on which M does
not converge to an index for A, that is, M does not learn A.
Remark 3.4. Limit-refuting learnable classes do not contain in1nite ascending chains.
The assertion is immediate from Remark 2.4, because by de1nition a limit-refuting
learner converges on all texts.
The following remark extends the observation of Mukouchi and Arikawa [22] that
any refuting learnable class is also reliably learnable.
Remark 3.5. For any class C,
C refuting learnable⇒C limit-refuting learnable
⇒C reliably learnable (1)
and both implications are strict. In particular, the concepts of refuting learnable, limit-
refuting learnable and reliably learnable class are mutually distinct.
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The 1rst implication in (1) is immediate by de1nition, while the second one follows
by Remark 3.2. Moreover, the 1rst two concepts are separated by the class considered
in Remark 3.9 below, while the class of all 1nite sets is reliably learnable but is not
limit-refuting learnable, as follows by Remarks 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
Remark 3.6. Reliable learners have been introduced by Minicozzi [21] by a slightly
diLerent formulation where on any text for a set the learner either learns the set or
diverges. Minicozzi’s de1nition is apparently less restrictive than De1nition 3.1, because
the former allows that a learner fails to learn a set A while it still converges to an
index for A on some texts for A. Nevertheless, both de1nitions yield the same concept
of reliably learnable class. A similar statement holds with respect to corresponding less
restrictive de1nitions of refuting and limit-refuting learning where for example in the
case of limit-refuting learning one just requires that on any text for a set the learner
either converges to an index for this set or converges to the refutation symbol.
For a proof, we will show for refuting, limit-refuting, and reliable learning that given
a learner M0 that satis1es the less restrictive de1nition, there is a learner M that learns
all sets learned by M0 and satis1es the corresponding condition from De1nition 3.1.
In the case of limit-refuting learning we can simply pick a learner M according to
Remark 2.5. Then by construction, M learns all sets learned by M0 and any set is
either learned or limit-refuted by M . In the case of reliable learning, by a construction
similar to the one described in Remark 2.5, we obtain a learner M such that on any
text for any language A, the learner M converges to an index for A in case there is
a stabilizing sequence for M0 and A, while M diverges, otherwise. In particular, M
is reliable in the sense of De1nition 3.1 and learns all sets that are learned by M0.
Finally, in the case of refuting learning, de1ne a learner M by
M () =


? if M0() =? for some  with
range() ⊆ range() and ||6 ||;
M0() otherwise:
Then M learns all sets learned by M0 and refutes all other sets, i.e., M refutes exactly
the sets A such that M0 outputs a refutation symbol on some text for A.
Remark 3.7. Minicozzi [21] showed that 1nite unions of reliably learnable classes are
also reliably learnable. Similar assertions hold for all variants of refuting learning by
the following simple principle. Given k refuting learners M1; M2; : : : ; Mk for the classes
C1;C2; : : : ;Ck , the learner M given by
M () =
{
Ml() if l is the least index with Ml() 	=?;
? otherwise;
learns the union C of the classes C1;C2; : : : ;Ck with respect to the same variant of
refuting learning.
By Remarks 3.3 and 3.4, any refuting learnable class C contains only 1nite sets
and any in1nite set A contains some 1nite set D =∈C. Mukouchi and Arikawa [23]
152 W. Merkle, F. Stephan / Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2003) 145–177
demonstrated that in the case of unrestricted learners, the two latter properties can be
extended to a characterization of the sharply refuting learnable classes, i.e., in our terms
a class C is sharply refuting learnable by an unrestricted learner iL there are 1nite sets
D0; D1; : : : such that any in1nite set contains some set Di while none of the sets Di is
contained in any set in C. The following theorem is essentially a reformulation of the
characterization of Mukouchi and Arikawa. Recall in connection with the theorem that
by de1nition a class is refuting learnable if and only if it is contained in an sharply
refuting learnable class.
Theorem 3.8 (Mukouchi and Arikawa [23]). A class C is sharply refuting learnable
i: C contains only 8nite sets and there is a recursively enumerable class {D0; D1; : : :}
of 8nite sets such that C coincides with the class {X : Di*X for all i}.
Theorem 3.8 implies in particular that sharply refuting learnable classes are closed
under taking subsets.
Proof. First assume that C is sharply refuting learnable, that is, C contains exactly the
sets that are learned by some refuting learner M . Then C contains only 1nite sets by
Remark 3.2. Moreover, the class D of all 1nite sets D such that there is a string  over
D where M ()=? is obviously recursively enumerable and exactly the sets that are not
learned by M contain some set in D. Conversely, given a recursively enumerable class
as in the theorem and a representing function g, a refuting learner for C is obtained
as follows. On input , the learner checks whether Fg(i)⊆range() for any i6||. If
so, the learner outputs a refutation symbol while, otherwise, it outputs an index for
range().
Remark 3.9. Theorem 3.8 does not extend to limit-refuting learning. A counter exam-
ple is given by the class C of all sets of the form {0; 2; 4; : : : ; 2n; 2n+1}. The class C
is learned by the limit-refuting learner that outputs an index for the 1nite set seen so
far in case this set is in C and, otherwise, outputs a refutation symbol. However, the
set of all even numbers is in1nite and any of its 1nite subsets with maximum m can
be extended to the set {0; 2; 4; : : : ; m; m+ 1} in C, i.e., there is no sequence D0; D1; : : :
as in Theorem 3.8.
The following theorem shows that also the property of limit-refuting learnable classes
shown in Remark 3.4 can be extended to a characterization.
Theorem 3.10. A class is limit-refuting learnable i: it is contained in a recursively
enumerable class of 8nite sets that does not contain any in8nite ascending chain.
Proof. Let C be a class of 1nite sets that is recursively enumerable with representing
function g and does not contain any in1nite ascending chain. Consider the learner
M that on input  outputs an index for range() in case the latter set is among
Fg(0); : : : ;Fg(||) and, otherwise, outputs ?. Then, obviously, M is computable and learns
every set in C. Moreover, M limit-refutes any set A =∈C. In case A is 1nite, this is
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immediate by the construction of M . So assume that A is in1nite and let a1; a2; : : : be
any text for A. As C contains no in1nite chains, C contains only 1nitely many sets
of the form {a1; a2; : : : ; an} and hence M outputs a refutation symbol on almost all
pre1xes of the given text.
In order to prove the reverse direction, assume that we are given a class C0 that is
learned by a limit-refuting learner M . Let the class C contain all 1nite sets C such
that
for all  ∈ (C ∪ {#})∗ with ||6 |C|;
there is  ∈ (C ∪ {#})∗ with M () 	=?: (2)
The set of all indices i such that (2) is satis1ed with C replaced by Fi is recursively
enumerable, that is, C is a recursively enumerable class of 1nite sets. Moreover, by
construction, C contains all 1nite sets that are learned by M , hence C0 is contained in
C. Assume now for a proof by contradiction that A0; A1; A2; : : : is an in1nite ascending
chain that is contained in C and let A be the union of the sets Ai. Then by Remark 3.3,
the learner M limit-refutes the in1nite set A and hence, by Remark 2.5, there is a
stabilizing sequence  for A and M with range()⊆A and M ()=? for any string 
with range()⊆A. Thus (2) is false for all 1nite subsets C of A where range()⊆C
and ||6|C|. Consequently, contrary to our assumption, almost all sets Ai are not in C.
Recall that a con1dent learner is a learner that always converges to a natural num-
ber, see De1nition 2.3. Given any limit-refuting learner, according to Remark 3.2 this
learner can be transformed into an equivalent reliable learner. Similarly, by replacing
all refutation symbols by any 1xed index, we can transform any limit-refuting learner
into a con1dent learner that learns the same class, that is, any limit-refuting learnable
class is also con1dently learnable. Theorem 3.11 shows that the reverse implication is
true for classes that are closed under taking subsets.
Theorem 3.11. Let the class C be closed under taking subsets. Then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(a) C is limit-refuting learnable.
(b) C is con8dently learnable.
(c) C is learned by a refuting learner that may use the halting problem K as an
oracle.
Proof. By a standard argument, a class that contains an in1nite sets and all its subsets
cannot be learned at all. As a consequence, all three conditions imply that C contains
only 1nite sets. Recall from the discussion preceding Theorem 3.11 that (a) implies (b).
(a)⇒ (c): Let M be a limit-refuting learner for C and by Remark 2.5 assume that
any text of any set A has a 1nite pre1x  that is a stabilizing sequence in the sense
that M ()=M () for all  with range()⊆A. By Remark 3.5, all sets learned by M
are 1nite.
Consider the learner N that on input  outputs an index for the range of  if for all
4 there is n with M (#n) 	=? and, otherwise, outputs a refutation symbol. Obviously,
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the learner N is K-recursive and on any text, keeps the refutation symbol after having
output it once. Hence it suTces to show that N is limit-refuting and learns C. So 1x
any set A.
First assume that A is in C. Then M learns A and all its subsets. Thus N outputs
an index for range() for every ∈(A∪{#})∗. But A must be 1nite, and consequently
N learns A.
Next assume that A is in1nite. Then M does not learn A but converges on every
text for A to the refutation symbol. By assumption on M , any given text for A has
a pre1x  that is a stabilizing sequence, i.e., M outputs the refutation symbol on all
extensions of . As a consequence, N converges to the refutation symbol on any text
for A.
It remains the case that A is a 1nite set not belonging to C. Then by construction,
N either converges on any text for A to an index of A or N converges on any text for
A to the refutation symbol.
(c)⇒ (a): Let N be a K-recursive refuting learner for C and for every s, let Ks
denote the s-step approximation of K, i.e., a number is in Ks iL it is enumerated into
K within s steps of some appropriate enumeration of K. Then C is learned by the
limit-refuting learner M that on input  checks whether there is a string  where
||6 max range() and range() ⊆ range() and NK||() =? (3)
and if so, outputs a refutation symbol and, otherwise, outputs an index for range().
The key observation in the veri1cation of the construction is that for any 1xed string
 and for almost all s the output of N on input  is the same for oracle K and for
oracle Ks. First consider a 1nite set D. In case there is a string  such that (3) holds
with range() and K|| replaced by D and K, respectively, then on any text for D,
the learner M will converge to the refutation symbol while, otherwise, the learner
converges on any text for D to an index for D. In particular, the learner learns every
1nite set learned by N , and hence, by the introductory remark, learns C. Moreover,
given any text T for an in1nite set A, there is a string  over A with N ()=?, and thus
on all pre1xes  of T that are suTciently long, M will output a refutation symbol.
(b)⇒ (a): Fix a con1dent learner M for C. Let C1 be the class that contains the
empty set and all non-empty 1nite sets C where
for all  ∈ C∗ with ||¡ |C|; there is  ∈ C∗ with M () 	= M (): (4)
Then C1 is recursively enumerable and thus by Theorem 3.10 it suTces to show that
C1 contains C and does not contain any in1nite ascending chain.
In order to show C⊆C1 1x any non-empty set C∈C and recall that by the introduc-
tory remark, C is 1nite. Thus in order to show that C is in C1, it remains to show that
C satis1es (4). Let  be any string over C with ||¡|C|. By assumption, M learns the
set C and its subset range(), and hence there are strings 1 and 2 over C such that
M (1) and M (2) are indices for the two distinct sets C and range(), respectively.
As a consequence, M () 	=M (1) or M () 	=M (2), i.e., there is a string  as required
in (4).
Next, we show that given an in1nite ascending chain C0; C1; : : : of sets in C1, contrary
to our assumption on M , we could construct a text on which M diverges. The text
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is constructed by de1ning inductively pre1xes of the text of increasing length. During
the construction we will ensure that each such pre1x is a string over one of the sets
Ci. We start with the empty string and given an already constructed pre1x  in C∗i ,
we choose j¿i with ||¡|Cj|. By assumption, Cj satis1es (4) and so we can pick an
extension ∈C∗j with M () 	=M ().
Theorem 3.12. In a setting of learners that use canonical indices as hypotheses, any
class is limit-refuting learnable if and only if it is con8dently learnable.
Proof. We have already seen for all indexings considered here that any limit-refuting
learnable class is con1dently learnable. In order to show the reverse implication, let C
be the class of sets that are learned by a con1dent learner M0 via canonical indices.
By Remark 2.5, we can assume that for any given set, M0 converges on all texts for
this set to the same index. We show that the learner M de1ned by
M () =
{
M0() in case FM0() = range();
? otherwise
is limit-refuting and learns exactly the same sets as M0. Fix an arbitrary set A and
assume that on any text for A, the con1dent learner M0 converges to the canonical
index i. In case M0 learns A, that is, if i is an index for A, it is easy to see that
M converges to i on any text for A, too. On the other hand, in case M0 does not
learn A, then for any text for A, almost all pre1xes have range diLerent from A and
consequently M converges to ?.
4. Refuting learning in a logical setting
In the sequel, we consider learning in a logical setting, that is, the classes to be
learned, the data, and occasionally also the hypotheses are given in terms of logical
formulae. We will always work with a logical language L that consist of a unary
predicate symbol P plus a subset of the symbols {s;¡;+; ∗; U0; U1; : : :}. The structures
considered all have domain N and the interpretation of the symbols other than P is
always the usual one, that is, Un is interpreted as number n; s is the successor function,
¡ is the usual strict order on natural numbers, and + and ∗ are interpreted as addition
and multiplication over N. We will refer to such structures as standard structures.
The aim of the learning process is then to identify the interpretation of P. The logical
language L will be chosen among:
B={P; U0; U1; U2; : : :}, the basic language,
S=B∪{s}, the language of successor,
O=B∪{s;¡}, the language of order,
P=B∪{s;¡;+}, the language of Presburger’s arithmetic,
A=B∪{s;¡;+; ∗}, the language of arithmetic.
With a language L understood, the standard structure determined by a set A is
denoted by M(A). In the setting considered here, a set A and the structure M(A) are
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essentially equivalent. Accordingly, we extend the notation introduced in connection
with the learning of sets to the learning of L-structures. For example, given any
L-structure M(A), an L-text for M(A) or, for short, a text for M(A) is simply a
text for the set A and a learner learns M(A) if on every text for M(A), the learner
converges to an index for A. Moreover, given a sentence  and a set A, we write
[A] for the truth value of  in M(A).
A class C of standard structures is called L-axiomatizable if and only if there is
an L-sentence  such that C contains exactly those standard structures in which
the formula is true, i.e., C={X :[X ]}. Before investigating into the learning of
axiomatizable classes in Section 5, we review some well-known facts about such
classes.
Remark 4.1. Any P-axiomatizable class of 1nite sets is computable. For a proof, recall
that Presburger’s arithmetic, i.e., the theory of the natural numbers with addition, is
decidable [26,29]. As a consequence, given an index i and a P-formula , we can
eLectively test whether  is true in the standard structure determined by the 1nite set
Fi={n1; : : : ; nm} by 1rst replacing in  every subformula of the form Pt; t a term, by
t=n1∨ · · · ∨ t=nm, then checking whether the resulting formula is true in Presburger’s
arithmetic.
Remark 4.2. For any O-axiomatizable class C, the set
IC = {i: (∃C ∈ C) [Fi ⊆ C]}
of canonical indices of all subsets of the sets in C is computable. A proof can be
derived by an argument similar to the one used in Remark 4.1, using BVuchi’s result
[2,32] that the monadic second-order theory of the natural numbers with successor and
order is decidable.
Remark 4.3. The Theorem of Matiyasevich (see for example SmoryWnski [29]) states
that every recursively enumerable set is Diophantine and thus can be de1ned by a
positive existential A-sentence. More precisely, from an index for a recursively enu-
merable set W we can compute eLectively a constant l and polynomials f and g in
l+ 1 variables and with coeTcients in N such that for all x∈N,
x ∈ W iL (∃z1 : : :∃zl ∈ N)[f(x; z1; : : : ; zl) = g(x; z1; : : : ; zl)]: (5)
Hence the matrix of the right-hand side of (5) is an A-formula. Furthermore, if W is
computable, then its complement is recursively enumerable and so for suitable poly-
nomials f′; g′ as above we have for all x∈N,
x ∈ W iL (∀z1 : : :∀zl ∈ N)[f′(x; z1; : : : ; zl) 	= g′(x; z1; : : : ; zl)]: (6)
So we obtain a positive universal A-sentence that de1nes W because the subformula
f′(: : :) 	=g′(: : :) is equivalent to f′(: : :)¡g′(: : :) ∨ g′(: : :)¡f′(: : :).
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Now consider any k -set A, i.e., in case k is even there is a recursive set W such
that for all x,
x ∈ A ⇔ (∀y1 : : :∃yh)[〈x; y1; : : : ; yh〉 ∈ W ]
and in case k is odd, there is a recursive set W such that for all x,
x ∈ A ⇔ (∀y1 : : :∀yh)[〈x; y1; : : : ; yh〉 ∈ W ];
where in both cases there are exactly k − 1 alternations of quanti1ers. Recall that
the function 〈: : :〉 is obtained by iterating the standard pairing function (x1; x2) →
((x1 + x2)2 + 3x1 + x2)=2, hence 2h+1〈x; y1; : : : ; yh〉 can be written as a polynomial
in x and the yi that has coeTcients in N. Again using the representation of recursively
enumerable sets by Diophantine equations, we infer that for k even or odd, the set A
can be represented by
x ∈ A ⇔ (∀y1 : : :∃yh ∃z1 : : :∃zl)
[f(x; y1; : : : ; yh; z1; : : : ; zl) = g(x; y1; : : : ; yh; z1; : : : ; zl)];
x ∈ A ⇔ (∀y1 : : :∀yh ∀z1 : : :∀zl)
[f′(x; y1; : : : ; yh; z1; : : : ; zl) 	= g′(x; y1; : : : ; yh; z1; : : : ; zl)];
respectively, i.e., by positive A-sentences with the same number k − 1 of alternations
of quanti1ers. Furthermore, these formulae can be eLectively computed from a recur-
sive index of the set W and an appropriate representation of the quanti1er pre1x for
the variables y1; : : : ; yh.
Remark 4.4. Besides learners that state their hypotheses in the form of canonical, com-
putable or recursively enumerable indices of sets, in the logical setting one can also
consider learners that state their hypotheses in the form of logical formulae. We con-
sider two ways of indexing sets by logical formulae, which might be called coinciding
indices and subset indices. A formula used as a coinciding index is true for (and thus
identi1es) exactly one structure in the class to be learned, while for a formula used as
a subset index, among all structures in the class to be learned that satisfy the formula
there is a unique least structure (with respect to set theoretical inclusion), which is
hence identi1ed by the formula. Learning via subset indices has been considered by
Martin, Sharma and Stephan [20]. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the results shown
in the sequel hold no matter whether we use canonical, computable, recursively enu-
merable, coinciding or subset indices, as long as all sets to be learned can be indexed
at all by such indices. Accordingly, when stating these results we do not make explicit
the indexing used.
The interplay between logic and learning has been considered before in several papers
[4,5,6,13,15,16,18,19,20,28]. In connection with the learning of standard structures, the
type of texts used above are essentially equivalent to a sequence that contains exactly
the atomic L-sentences that are true in the structure to be learned, a type of data
presentation considered by Shinohara [28].
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5. Learning axiomatizable classes from standard text
We show in this section for various models of learning that classes that are axiom-
atizable in an appropriate language and are learned by an unrestricted learner are in
fact learnable. Before, we extend in Theorem 5.1 the characterizations of refuting and
limit-refuting learnability stated in Theorems 3.8 and 3.10 to unrestricted learners. The
proofs of the results for unrestricted learners are essentially the same as in the eLective
case and are omitted.
Theorem 5.1 (Mukouchi and Arikawa [23]). A class C has an unrestricted sharply
refuting learner i: C contains only 8nite sets and there is a sequence D0; D1; : : : of
8nite sets such that C coincides with the class {X : Di*X for all i}.
A class C has an unrestricted limit-refuting learner i: C contains only 8nite sets
and C does not contain any in8nite ascending chain of 8nite sets.
Theorem 5.2. Any P-axiomatizable class that has an unrestricted limit-refuting
learner is limit-refuting learnable.
Proof. Let C be any P-axiomatizable class that has an unrestricted limit-refuting
learner. Then C is a computable class of 1nite sets according to Remark 4.1 and
Theorem 5.1. We show that C is limit-refuting learned by the learner that on input 
outputs an index for the 1nite set range() in case this set is in C and, otherwise, out-
puts a refutation symbol. The learner obviously learns every set in C and limit-refutes
any 1nite set not in C. Moreover, as C can be limit-refuting learned by an unrestricted
learner and hence does not contain in1nite ascending chains of 1nite sets according to
Theorem 5.1, the learner limit-refutes all in1nite sets.
Theorem 5.3. (a) Any O-axiomatizable class that has an unrestricted refuting learner
is refuting learnable.
(b) Any P-axiomatizable class that has an unrestricted refuting learner is refuting
learnable by a learner that may use the halting problem K as an oracle.
Proof. Let C be any class that has an unrestricted refuting learner and let IC be de1ned
as in Remark 4.2, i.e., IC is the set of canonical indices of all subsets of the sets in C.
Now consider the unrestricted learner M that on input  outputs an index for the 1nite
set range() in case the canonical index of this set is in IC and, otherwise, outputs a
refutation symbol. For O-axiomatizable C, by Remark 4.2, the set IC and hence also
M is computable. For P-axiomatizable C, by Remark 4.1 the set IC is recursively
enumerable and hence M is computable relative to oracle K .
So it suTces to show that the class C is indeed refuting learned by M . Observe
that M learns all subsets of sets in C and refutes all other 1nite sets. Hence it remains
to show that M refutes all in1nite sets, where actually it suTces to show that M
limit-refutes all in1nite sets because by construction, whenever M outputs a refutation
symbol on a string then so does M on any extension of this string. So 1x any in1nite
set A and, by assumption on C, 1x a class C1 that contains C and is sharply refuting
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learned by an unrestricted learner. By Theorem 5.1, there is a 1nite set D⊆A that is not
contained in any set in C1 and hence is not contained in any set in C. Consequently, on
any text for A, the learner M outputs a refutation symbol as soon as the data contains
D, hence M limit-refutes A.
Theorem 5.5 below shows that the assertion on P-axiomatizable classes in Theorem 5.3
cannot be strengthened to computable learners in place of learners that may use the
halting problem. In the proof of Theorem 5.5, we exploit that given a predicate for
the square numbers, we can de1ne multiplication in P. This technique, which is due
to Putnam [27], is described in Remark 5.4.
Remark 5.4. If we add to P a unary predicate Q that is meant to be always interpreted
by the set {0; 1; 4; : : :} of squares, we can de1ne a formula ( such that ((x; y; z) is true
(in the standard model of the natural numbers) if and only if z is the product of x and
y. For a start, we use the fact that the distance between successive squares m2 and
(m + 1)2 is just 2m + 1 in order to de1ne the following formula due to Putnam [27,
Eq. (21)]
(x; u) ≡ Qu ∧ Q(u+ x + x + U1) ∧ (∀t ¡ x + x)[¬Q(u+ t + U1)];
where (x; u) is true if and only if u is the square of x. Using this formula, we can
simply let
((x; y; z) ≡ (∃u; v; w)[(x; u) ∧ (y; v) ∧ (x + y; w) ∧ w = u+ z + z + v]: (7)
Theorem 5.5. There is a P-axiomatizable class that has an unrestricted refuting
learner but has no refuting learner.
Proof. For the scope of this proof, let for all e and m,
S(e; m) = {e; e + 1; e + 4; : : : ; e + m2}:
Recall from Remark 4.3 that by the theorem of Matiyasevich we can choose a Dio-
phantine representation of the halting problem K, i.e., there are polynomials f and g
with coeTcients in N such that for all e,
e ∈ K iL (∃z1; : : : ; zl ∈ N) [f(e; z1; : : : ; zl) = g(e; z1; : : : ; zl)]: (8)
The formula on the right-hand side of (8) can be written as an A-formula and, by
replacing multiplication according to Remark 5.4 and introducing suTciently many
intermediate variables zl+1; : : : ; zk , the formula can be written as a formula (e) over
P∪{Q} that has the form
(∃z1 ∈ N : : :∃zk ∈ N)[.0(e; z1; : : : ; zk)];
where the matrix .0(e; z1; : : : ; zk) is just the conjunction over terms of the form y0=
y1 + y2 and Q(y0) with yi=e or yi=zj. Furthermore, there is a formula (e; m) over
P∪{Q} expressing that (e) is true via z1 through zk such that all the zj satisfy in
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addition zj6m. For further use, observe that given e and m we can check eLectively
whether (e; m) is true by searching through the 1nitely many tuples (z1; : : : ; zk) where
zj6m for j=1; : : : ; k. By de1nition of , we have
e ∈ K if and only if (∃m)[(e; m)]: (9)
For any e in K , let me be minimum over all m such that (e; m) is true. Let
Ae = S(e; me) = {e; e + 1; e + 4; : : : ; e + m2e} and C = {Ae: e ∈ K}:
We show that C is the class we are looking for. First, we de1ne an unrestricted refuting
learner that learns C. In case the data seen so far contains nothing but pause symbols,
N outputs an index for the empty set. Otherwise let D be the non-empty set of all
numbers seen so far. In this case N checks whether there is an index e6minD with
Ae∈C and D⊆Ae. If yes, N outputs an index for D, if no, N outputs a refutation
symbol. By construction, N learns all sets contained in any set in C and hence learns
C. It remains to show that N refutes all sets that are not contained in a set in C, where
actually it suTces to show that N limit-refutes all such sets because by construction,
if N outputs a refutation symbol on some input, then it does so on all extensions of
this input. So 1x any set A that is not contained in any set in C and for all e in
K∩{0; : : : ;min A}, let ve be the least number in A\Ae. Then on any text for A, the
learner N will output nothing but refutation symbols after having seen min A and all
the ve.
Second, assume that there were a refuting learner M for C. Then by Remark 3.4, the
class of sets learned by M does not contain in1nite ascending chains and in particular
for any index e, some of the sets S(e; 0)⊆S(e; 1)⊆S(e; 2); : : : are refuted by M . In
fact, we can pick a computable function e → re such that for all e, the learner M
refutes the set S(e; re) because given e, we can 1nd a suitable value re by simulating
M in parallel on appropriate texts for the sets S(e; j); j∈N. By the remark made after
Theorem 3.8, the class of sets learned by M is closed under taking subsets and so for
any e in K, the refuted set S(e; re) cannot be contained in the set S(e; me), which is
learned, i.e., me must be less than re. Hence for e in K, (e; re) is true, whereas for e
not in K; (e; m) is false for all m. But as the truth value of (e; re) can be decided
eLectively in e, we obtain as a contradiction that K is computable.
Third, we show that the class C is P-axiomatizable via a formula .1∧.2. The
formula .1 is simply an axiomatization of the class of all sets S(e; m) with e; m∈N
that is obtained by requiring that the set under consideration is 1nite, the two least
elements have distance 1, and the subsequent distances between successive elements
always increase by 2. In order to de1ne .2, let ′(e; m) be the formula obtained by
replacing in (e; m) all subformulae of the form Qw by the formula P(w + min P).
Then we have for all e and m,
(e; m) is true if and only if ′(e; m) is true in M(S(e; m)): (10)
For a proof, observe that by convention, while evaluating the formulae in (10), Q is
interpreted by the set of squares and P is interpreted by the set S(e; m). In this situa-
tion, both formulae are essentially equivalent up to the fact that, intuitively speaking,
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 uses the set of all squares whereas ′ uses just the subset {0; 1; : : : ; m2} of all
squares that are encoded into the set S(e; m). This diLerence, however, cannot result
in diLerent truth values because also with , just squares of size at most m2 occur as
witnesses.
Then let .2 be a formula that expresses that the two greatest elements of the set
under consideration have distance 2m − 1 and that ′(e; m′) is true for m′=m but is
false for all m′¡m. Observe that for any set S(e; m) of size at least 2, the distance
between the greatest element e + m2 and the next element is indeed 2m− 1.
It remains to show that .1∧.2 axiomatizes C. A set that is not of the form S(e; m)
cannot be in C and does not satisfy .1. So consider any set S(e; m). In case e is not
in K , the set is not in C, but also does not satisfy .2 because ′(e; m) is false for
all m according to (9) and (10). Next assume that e is in K . In case m diLer from
me, the set is not in C and .2 is false by de1nition of me and (10). In case m=me,
however, the set is in C and .1∧.2 is satis1ed.
In the proof of Theorem 5.5, we have constructed a P-axiomatizable class C that
has no refuting learner but has an unrestricted refuting learner. The unrestricted learner
constructed does not learn the class C sharply refuting, i.e., it learns a proper superclass
of C. The following argument shows that this is necessarily so. A P-axiomatizable
class C that is sharply refuting learned by an unrestricted learner must be closed under
taking subsets. Then any set F is contained in a set in C iL F itself is in C and
consequently, an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.3 shows
that the set IC de1ned there is computable and that we can obtain a refuting learner
for C.
6. Learning O-axiomatizable classes from k-texts
In this section we consider learning models where the information given in the data
is not just a listing of all elements of the set A to be learned but in addition contains all
formulae of a certain type that are true in M(A). Similar settings have been considered
before, e.g., by Gasarch and Smith [5], Martin and Osherson [18], Martin et al. [20],
and Shinohara [28].
Recall that a 0-L-formula is an L-formula without quanti1ers while for all k¿1,
a k -L-formula is an L-formula that consists of a quanti1er pre1x followed by a
quanti1er-free formula where the pre1x starts with a universal quanti1er and has at most
k−1 alternations between universal and existential quanti1ers (e.g., for a quanti1er-free
L-formula , the formula (∀x1∀x2∃x3) [(x1; x2; x3)] is a 2-L-formula). The concept
of a 0k -L-formula is de1ned almost literally the same except that the quanti1er pre1x
of such a formula starts with an existential quanti1er. Recall further that a k -L-
sentence is a k -L-formula that does not contain free variables and that an L-formula
is positive iL it does not contain logical connectives other than ∨ and ∧.
Denition 6.1. A k -L-text for a set A is a sequence that, besides pause symbols,
contains exactly all the positive k -sentences that are valid in M(A).
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For any set A, a text and a 0-L-text for A provide essentially the same information,
whereas we will see below that for k¿0, in general more classes can be learned from
k -L-texts than just from texts.
Remark 6.2. As already observed by Martin et al. [20], there is no need to de1ne 0k -
texts because the amount of information provided by a k -L-text and by a 0k+1-L-text
is exactly the same. For a proof, observe that for any k -formula (x1; : : : ; xm), in any
standard structure the 0k+1-formula (∃x1 : : : xm) [(x1 : : : xm)] is true if and only if for
some n1; : : : ; nm, the k -formula (n1; : : : ; nm) is true.
Remarks 3.3 and 3.5 imply that for any language L, just classes of 1nite sets
can be refuting, limit-refuting, or reliably learned from 0-L-text. In contrast to this,
Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 show that 2-O-texts permit limit-refuting and 1-O-texts permit
reliably learning, respectively, of all countable O-axiomatizable classes.
Theorem 6.3. Any countable O-axiomatizable class is limit-refuting learnable from
2-O-texts.
Proof. Fix any countable O-axiomatizable class C. First we use a result of BVuchi [2]
in order to show that there is a natural number n such that C is contained in the class
Cn of all sets that are ultimately periodic with period n, i.e., that satisfy the formula
n ≡ (∃x) (∀y ¿ x) [P(y + Un) = Py]:
It then suTces to show that the classes Cn can be learned as required. For further use
note that n can be rewritten as an S-formula by replacing y+ Un by the term s : : : sy
that corresponds to an n-fold application of the successor operation.
In order to show that C is contained is some class Cn, observe that the O-axiomatiz-
able class C is a fortiori axiomatizable in the monadic second order theory over S (in
which ¡ can be de1ned). As a consequence, there is a BVuchi automaton that accepts
exactly the sets in C, i.e., A∈C iL there is an accepting state of the automaton that is
reached in1nitely often while scanning A (see Thomas [32] for details). Let q1; : : : ; qm
be the accepting states of the automaton that can be reached at all and for i=1; : : : ; m,
consider the set of all binary strings ! such that when reading ! with initial state qi,
the automaton ends in state qi, and let Wi contain the strings in this set that are minimal
with respect to the pre1x relation. Then the class C contains exactly the sets that can
be written in the form (0(1(2 : : : where for some i, the string (0 leads from the initial
state to qi and the strings (1; (2; : : : are all in Wi. Now assume that for some i, the
set Wi contains two distinct strings ! and !′. Then 0=!!′ and 1=!′! are distinct
strings of the same length and hence for some string (, the mapping X → (X (0)X (1) : : :
is a one-to-one mapping from sets to the class C, i.e., contrary to assumption, C cannot
be countable. Consequently, all nonempty Wi are singletons, say Wi={!i}, and any set
in C, for some i, can be written as (!i!i!i : : : and is hence ultimately periodic with
period |!i|. As a consequence, all sets in C are ultimately periodic where the period
n can be chosen as the product of |!i| over all i such that Wi is nonempty.
It remains to show that for any n, the class Cn is limit-refuting learnable from 2-O-
texts. For a formula 3(x) and a term t, let 3(t) be obtained by replacing in 3(x) all
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occurrences of x with t. For all numbers n and m, let 3m;n(x) be a formula such that
for all numbers k, 3m;n(Uk) is true in M(A) if and only if A contains at least m of the n
numbers k +1; k +2; : : : ; k + n. We can choose the formulae 3m;n(x) as quanti1er-free,
positive S-formulae, for example, we let
32;3(x) ≡ (Psx ∧ Pssx) ∨ (Psx ∧ Psssx) ∨ (Pssx ∧ Psssx):
Then a set A is ultimately periodic with period n if and only if for almost all numbers
k, the formula 3m;n(Uk) is true in M(A) while the formula 3m+1; n(Uk) is false. The learner
for Cn now works as follows.
Algorithm. First check if there is m6n and k0 such that the data seen so far contains
the 1rst but not the second formula in
(∀x ¿ k0)[3m;n(x)]; (∀y) (∃x) [y ¡ x ∧ 3m+1;n(x)]: (11)
In case there is no such m, output a refutation symbol. Otherwise, 1x minimal such m
and for this m, 1x minimal such k0. Let k1¿k0 be minimal such that for all k¿k1, the
data does not contain 3m+1; n(Uk). Then output an index for the set A that agrees with
the data seen so far on the interval {0; : : : ; k1 + n− 1} and that from k1 on has period
n in the sense that for all k¿k1, we have A(k)=A(k + n).
Verication. Fix any set A and let m0 be maximal such that in M(A) for almost all
k, the formula 3m0 ; n(Uk) is true. Then the 1rst formula in (11) will appear in the data
(for appropriate values of k0) exactly for all m6m0, while the second formula appears
at least for all m6m0.
In case 3m0+1; n(Uk) holds in M(A) just for 1nitely many k, the set A is ultimately
periodic with period m0 and is hence in Cn. In this case for m=m0, the second formula
in (11) will never appear in the data and hence the learner converges to an index for A.
In case 3m0+1; n(Uk) holds in M(A) for in1nitely many k, we infer by the maximality
of m0 that the formula cannot hold for all k and that hence A does not have period
m0 and is not in Cn. In this case, the data will eventually contain the second formula
in (11) with m=m0, and hence the learner correctly refutes the input-text.
Theorem 6.4. Any countable O-axiomatizable class is reliably learnable from 1-O-
texts.
Proof. By the discussion in the proof of Theorem 6.3 it suTces to show that the
class of all ultimately periodic sets can be learned as required. Fix an appropriate
enumeration 0; 1; : : : of all formulae of the form∧
k∈A∩{0;:::;k0+n+1}
P Uk ∧ (∀x ¿ k0)[3m;n(x)];
where A is an arbitrary set and where 3m;n with m6n is the formula de1ned in the
proof of Theorem 6.3. For all i, let Ai denote the (unique) minimum set such that i
is true in M(Ai) and observe that the class of ultimately periodic sets coincides with
the class {A0; A1; : : :}.
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Algorithm. If there is an index i such that the data seen so far contains i but contains
no formula PUk with k =∈Ai, let i0 be the least such index and output an index for Ai0 .
Otherwise, output an index for the 1nite set of all k such that the data contains PUk.
Verication. Fix an arbitrary set A. Then for any index i such that i is true in M(A)
but A diLers from Ai, the set Ai must be strictly contained in A and hence on any
text for A, the learner eventually sees a formula PUk with k =∈Ai and does not output an
index for Ai afterwards.
If A is ultimately periodic, let i0 be the least index such that A is equal to Ai0 . Then
by the preceding discussion, the learner will at most 1nitely often output an index for
a set Ai with i¡i0 and thus will converge to an index for A. If, on the other hand,
A is not ultimately periodic, then in particular A is not 1nite and hence the learner
diverges on any text for A on which it branches to the otherwise case in1nitely often.
But on all other texts the learner in1nitely often outputs an index for one of the sets
Ai, while by the introductory remark each such index is output at most 1nitely often,
i.e., in this case the learner diverges, too.
The class of all 1nite sets is easily seen to be O-axiomatizable and hence it can be
limit-refuting learned from 2-O-texts according to Theorem 6.3. In fact, this class is
sharply refuting learned from 2-O-texts by the learner that always outputs an index for
the 1nite set seen so far as long it has not yet seen the formula (∀y) (∃x) [y¡x∧Px],
in which case it outputs a refutation symbol. On the other hand, the class of 1nite
sets is an example for an O-axiomatizable class that cannot be limit-refuting learned
from 1-O-texts. This shows in particular that Theorem 6.3 cannot be improved from
2-O-texts to 1-O-texts.
Theorem 6.5. There is an O-axiomatizable class, namely the class of all 8nite sets,
that cannot be limit-refuting learned from 1-O-texts.
Proof. For a proof by contradiction, assume that there is a limit-refuting learner M
that learns the class of all 1nite sets from 1-O-texts. Let E0 be equal to {j2: j∈N}.
As there are only countably many indices, the learner M does not learn and hence must
refute some in1nite subset E of E0. Thus there is a stabilizing sequence for E and M
in the sense that there are 1nitely many 1-O-sentences 1; 2; : : : ; k that are all true
in M(E) and such that on having seen this sentences the learner M will output nothing
but refutation symbols unless some sentence comes up that is not true in M(E). We
now argue that M will not learn any 1nite subset D of E such that all the i are true
in M(D). In fact for such D, we can extend the sequence 1; 2; : : : ; k to a 1-O-text
for D. All the formulae appearing in this text are positive and hence hold not only in
the set D but also in its superset E, i.e., on this text the learner M converges to the
refutation symbol and not to an index for D.
Recall that a ground term is a term that does not contain variables and observe that
the non-ground terms over O have the form of zero or more successor symbols that are
followed by a variable. Let D be the 1nite set of all numbers in E that are denoted by
a ground term in some i. By the preceding discussion, we are done if we can show
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that all the i are true in M(D). So 1x an index i. Without loss of generality assume
that i is in prenex-normal form and let  be the part after the quanti1ers, that is,
 is a quanti1er-free O-formula with i being equivalent to (∀x1 : : : xn) [(x1 : : : xn)].
Note that  is also a positive formula. Then for any numbers z1; : : : ; zn, we have to
show that i[z1; : : : ; zn] is true in M(D). Given such zi, we can 1nd k such that for
any non-ground term t in i; t[z1 + k; : : : ; zn + k] is not in E0, i.e, is not a square. By
assumption, i is true in M(E) and hence so is [z1 + k; : : : ; zn + k]. We now argue
that for any atomic subformula . of , if .[z1 + k; : : : ; zn + k] is true in M(E), then
.[z1; : : : ; zn] is true in M(D). In case . is of the form t1= t2 or t1¡t2, this follows
easily by the special form of O-terms. Next assume that . is of the form Pt. Then if
t is a ground term, the assertion follows by de1nition of D whereas, otherwise, the
assertion is vacuously satis1ed because by choice of k; t[z1 + k; : : : ; zn + k] is not in
E. As a consequence and because i does not contain negation symbols, i is true in
M(D).
7. Learning S-axiomatizable classes from k-texts
By a result of Thomas [31,33], membership of a set L in an S-axiomatizable class
L can be checked by counting, up to some threshold value m, for all strings of
length less than or equal to some number n how often they appear as substring in the
characteristic sequence of L.
Fact 7.1. Let occm(L; ) be the minimum of m and the number of substrings of L
that are equal to . Say two languages L and H are (m; n)-equivalent if they satisfy
(∀k 6 n) [L(k) = H (k)] ∧ ∀ ∈ {0; 1}∗; ||6 n) [occm(L; ) = occm(H; )]:
For every S-axiomatizable class C there are constants m; n such that whenever two
languages L; H are (m; n)-equivalent then L∈L if and only if H ∈L.
By Fact 7.1, any S-axiomatizable class is equal to a union of equivalence classes
of (m; n)-equivalence. As a consequence, one can determine membership of a set L
in such a class by just analyzing L(0)L(1) : : : L(n) and the numbers occm(L; ) for all
strings  up to length n. For example, consider the S-axiomatizable class 0+1+0∞ of
all sets that have a characteristic function of the form 0i1j0∞ for some i; j¿0. For
n=2 and m=2 we then have
L ∈ 0+1+0∞ ⇔ L(0) = 0 ∧ (occm(L; 01) = 1 ∧ occm(L; 01) = 1):
Theorem 7.2. Every countable S-axiomatizable class can be limit-refuting learned
from 1-S-text.
Proof. Fix any countable S-axiomatizable class C. Like in the proof of Theorem 6.3
one can derive from the result of BVuchi [2] that there is some number n1 such that
every set in C is ultimately periodic with period n1, and hence with period kn1 for any
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natural number k¿1. Furthermore, by Fact 7.1, there are m and n0 such that the class C
is equal to the union of 1nitely many equivalence classes of (m; n0)-equivalence. Now
1x a natural number n¿n0 that is a multiple of n1. By de1nition, (m; n)-equivalence
implies (m; n0)-equivalence, hence C is the union of 1nitely many equivalence classes
of (m; n)-equivalence. By Remark 3.7 it is suTcient to show that each such equivalence
class can be limit-refuting learned from 1-S-text. So 1x such an equivalence class
H. By construction, any set in the subclass H of C can be written in the form 7∞
for some string 7 and a string  of length n. Again by Remark 3.7 it suTces to show
that for any given  of length n, the subclass of H of all sets of the form 7∞ can
be learned as required. So 1x an arbitrary string  of length n and let {b1; : : : ; bi} be
the set of positions that  maps to 1.
For any string 7, let the set L(7) be equal to 7∞. For the scope of this proof, call
7 admissible if L(7) is in H and call 7 consistent with a given S-sentence  if 
is true in M(L(7)), i.e., if  is true when the predicate symbol P is interpreted by
the set L(7). The hypotheses output by the learner constructed below will always be
of the form L(7) for appropriate strings 7. It is easy to see that the learner can rule
out all hypotheses L(7) where the string 7 is not admissible or is not consistent with
the data seen so far. The following claim shows that these two properties of 7 can be
checked by a computable learner.
Claim 1. Given a string 7 and an S-sentence , it can be eLectively checked whether
7 is admissible and whether 7 is consistent with .
It can be e:ectively checked whether 7 is admissible because by the special form
of the set L(7)=7∞ we can compute the length n pre8x of L(7) and the values
occm(L(7); ) for all strings  of length at most n.
Next we show that we can e:ectively decide whether  is true in M(L(7)). Similar
to the numbers b1; : : : ; bi de8ned above, let {a1; : : : ; aj} be the sets of positions that 7
maps to 1. Replace in  each subformula of the form Pt; t a term, by the formula
t = a1 ∨ · · · ∨ t = ai ∨ (∃y) [t = |7|+ Uny + b1 ∨ · · · ∨ t = |7|+ Uny + bj];
where Uny stands for n times adding y. By eliminating the predicate symbol P this way,
we obtain a P-sentence that is true (in the standard model of the natural numbers)
if and only if the original formula  is true in M(L(7)). Now we are done because
the set of all true P-sentences that do not contain the predicate symbol P, i.e., the
set of true sentences of Presburger’s arithmetic, is decidable.
For any string 7, we de8ne a positive 1-S-sentence 7 that is true in case P is
interpreted by L(7) but is false in case P is interpreted by any proper subset of L(7).
Given 7, as in the proof of Claim 1, let {a1; : : : ; aj} be the set of positions that 7
maps to 1. Let
7 = Pa0 ∧ Pa1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pai
∧(∀x ¿ |7| − 1) (∃k ¡ n) [P(x + k + b1) ∧ · · · ∧ P(x + k + bj)]
∧(∀x ¿ |7| − 1) [3j;n(x)];
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where the formula 3j; n(x) is de8ned as in the proof of Theorem 6.3. If i=0 or j=0,
the corresponding parts of 7 are replaced by a tautology, say sU0= U1, in order to
make the structure of the formula unique. Observe in connection with the de8nition
of 7 that any existential quanti8er that is bounded by a constant can be written
as a disjunction and that for any term c that is a sum of constants, the term x + c
stands for scx.
Algorithm. (Let ; m; n; j be the string and the numbers de1ned above.)
• Let 71; 72; : : : ; 7h be the sequence of all strings 7 such that the formula 7 has ap-
peared in the input text. The strings are ordered according their “date of appearance”,
i.e., 7i has appeared before 7i+1 .
• If there is an index k6h such that 7k is consistent with the current data (i.e., all
sentences contained in the data so far are true in M(L(7k))), then for the least such
k, select the string 7=7k .
• If we have just selected a string 7 and this string is admissible, output an index for
L(7), else output the refutation symbol.
Verication. By Claim 1 it is immediate that the constructed learner is indeed com-
putable. So it remains to show that the learner learns all sets in H that are of the form
L(7) and limit-refutes all other sets. The proof of this assertion is split into several
claims.
Claim 2. Let 7 be a string and let L be a proper subset of L(7). Then 7 is false in
M(L).
Fix a number d in L(7) that is not in L. In case d is in the domain of 7, the
formula 7 contains a conjunct equivalent to P Ud and hence is false in M(L). In case
d is not in the domain of 7, there is a number h such that d is in the domain of 7h+1
but not in the domain of 7h. If we let x= |7kh|, the interval {x; x+1; : : : ; x+ n− 1}
contains exactly j elements of L(7) and one of these elements is d, hence the subset
L of L(7) contains at most j − 1 elements in this interval. As a consequence, 3j; n(x)
and hence also 7 is false in M(L).
Claim 3. For any string 7 and on any text for a set that diLers from L(7), the learner
selects 7 at most 1nitely often.
For given 7, 8x any set L that di:ers from L(7). In case L is a proper subset of
L(7), then by Claim 2 the formula 7 will not appear in any text for L and hence
the learner will never select 7. In case there is an element d of L that is not in L(7),
as soon as the data contains the formula P Ud, the string 7 is no longer consistent with
the data seen so far and hence from that time on, the learner will not select 7.
Claim 4. Let L be a set of the form L(7). Then the learner learns L if L is in H and
limit-refutes L if L is not in H.
Fix any 1-S-text for L=L(7). Let 71; 72; : : : be the sequence of all strings 7 such
that 7 appears in this text, ordered by appearance of the formulae 7l . Let k be the
least index such that L is equal to L7k . Such an index exists because any 1-S-text
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for L(7) contains the formula 7. By Claim 3, any index l¡k will be selected at
most 8nitely often. Furthermore, the formula 7k eventually appears in the input and
is always consistent with the current data. So the learner will almost always select
the string 7k . But by de8nition, 7k is admissible if and only if L(7k) is in H, hence
the learner outputs almost always an index for L=L(7k) in case this set is indeed in
H, and, otherwise, outputs almost always a refutation symbol.
Claim 5. Let L be a set that is not of the form L(7) and where the characteristic
function of L contains the substring  in1nitely often. Then the learner limit-refutes L.
Let 1e12e2 : : : be a representation of L such that, for all k; ek¿1 and  	4k+1.
Let
<k = 1e1 : : : kek :
Let occm(<; ) the number (up to m) of occurrences of  in <. Then, since <k is a
pre8x of <k+1, we have for all k and ,
occm(<k ; )6 occm(<k+1; )6 m:
As a consequence, there is a number k¿1 such that, for all  of length at most n,
occm(<k ; ) = occm(<k+1; ):
From this equation one infers occm(<k ; )=m for every substring  of k+1 that
has length at most n. If there is now a string # such that the set <k#∞ is in H,
then also all sets where k+1 is inserted arbitrarily often between two occurrences of
 are in H, i.e., in particular, H contains all sets of the form
<k#(1(2 : : : ; (i ∈ {k+1; k+1}:
By assumption,  is not a pre8x of k+1 and hence 0=k+1 and 1=k+1 are
distinct strings of equal length. Like in the proof of Theorem 6.3, this then implies
that X → <k7X (0)X (1) : : : is a one-to-one mapping from sets to H, thus contradicting
the assumption that C is countable. So <k cannot be extended to a set of the form
L(7) in H.
Let DL be the sets of all elements of L that are in the domain of <k . Fix any text
for L and assume that the learning process has reached a stage where for all c in
DL the formula P Uc has already appeared in the data. Consider an arbitrary string
7 of length at least |<k | and let D7 be the sets of all places in the domain of <k
that 7 maps to 1. In case D7\DL is non-empty, the formula 7 is false in M (L)
and will not appear in any text for L, hence 7 is never selected. In case DL\D7 is
non-empty, say contains a number d, then 7 is not consistent with the formula P Ud,
which by assumption has already appeared in the input, hence 7 will never be selected.
Finally, in case the sets D7 and DL are the same, <k is a pre8x of 7. Hence by the
discussion in the preceding paragraph L(7) is not in H and thus 7 is not admissible.
In summary, after having seen the formulae P Uc for all elements of L in the domain
of <k , if a string 7 of length at least |<k | is selected at all, this string will not be
admissible. Now by assumption, L is not of the form L(7), hence by Claim 3 each
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of the 8nitely many strings 7 of length at most |<k | will be selected at most 8nitely
often. So the learner outputs almost always a refutation symbol.
Claim 6. If L contains  only 1nitely often as a substring, then the learner limit-refutes
L.
If for all strings 7, the formula 7 is false in M(L), then on any text for L the
learner outputs nothing but refutation symbols and we are done. So assume that 7
is true in M(L) for some 7. Then in particular for all x there is a constant k¡n such
that the j numbers x+ k + b1 through x+ k + bj are all contained in L. On the other
hand, the set L does not coincide with  on the interval {x + k; : : : ; x + k + n − 1}
for almost all x and k. Hence for almost all x there is k¡n such that this interval
contains at least n + 1 elements of L. As a consequence, the following sentence is
true in M(L):
(∀x ¿ c) (∃k ¡ n) [3j+1;n(x + k)]
and an equivalent sentence shows up in the 1-S-text of L. No language of the form
L(7) is consistent with this formula since every length n substring of ∞ contains
exactly j times a 1. Hence after having seen this formula, the learner always outputs
the refutation symbol.
By Claim 4, the learner works correctly for all sets of the form L(7), while Claims
5 and 6 establish that the learner limit-refutes any set that is not of this form. This
completes the proof that the given learning algorithm is a limit-refuting learner for
the class of all sets of the form L(7) in H. The class C is a 8nite union of classes
of the latter type and hence, by Remark 3.7, also C has a limit-refuting learner.
Remark 7.3. Similarly it holds that any countable B-axiomatizable class is limit-
refuting learnable from 1-B-texts. The class {A: | UA|61} is countable and B-
axiomatizable via the formula (∃x) (∀y) [x=y ∨ Py]. But this class is not learnable
from standard text at all. Since, for all languages L considered here, 0-L-texts are
equivalent to standard texts, it follows that results like Theorem 7.2 cannot be improved
to learnability from 0-L-texts.
8. Learning A-axiomatizable classes from k-texts
In this section we show—in contrast to O-axiomatizable classes considered in the
last section—that in the case of reliable and limit-refuting learning of A-axiomatizable
classes, for increasing k we can learn more and more classes from k -A-text.
Theorem 8.1. For every k, the class of all ∅k -recursive sets is not reliably learnable
from k -A-text but is reliably learnable from k+1-A-text. In particular, for every
k there is a countable A-axiomatizable class that is not reliably learnable from
k -A-texts.
We show the theorems of this section for learners that use subset indices but the
results holds by virtually the same proof for learners that use coinciding indices.
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Proof. Fix k and let C be the class of all ∅k -recursive sets. Recall that a set A
is in C iL A and its complement are both 0k+1-sets or, equivalently, iL A and its
complement are both k+1-sets. Furthermore, given an index e of an oracle Turing
machine that computes A relative to oracle ∅k , we can compute representations of A and
its complement as 0k+1- and k+1-sets and, by Remark 4.3, from these representations
we can compute positive k+1-A-formulae >e0 and >
e
1 such that for all n,
(n =∈ A iL >e0( Un)[A]) and (n ∈ A iL >e1(Un)[A]) (12)
in case A is computed by the e-th oracle Turing machine relative to oracle ∅k .
The reliable learner. Now we are in a position to de1ne a reliable learner N that
learns the class C from k+1-A-text. The learner N essentially works by syntactically
analyzing the data, i.e., it checks whether certain formulae containing >e0 and >
e
1 have
already appeared in the input text. Recall that the enumeration 〈(>e0 (x); >e1 (x))〉e∈N
of the k -A-formulae describing the ∅k -recursive sets is computable but in case the
eth oracle Turing machine with oracle ∅k is not total, the formulae >e0 (x) and >e1 (x)
might fail to describe any set uniquely. Note that these formulae do not contain the
predicate symbol P.
Algorithm. At any stage of the learning process, say that an index e quali1es if both
of the formulae
(a) (∀x) [>e0(x) ∨ Px]; (b) (∀x) [>e0(x) ∨>e1(x)] (13)
have appeared in the data seen so far but no formula of the form
(c) >e0( Un) ∧ P Un; (d) >e0( Un) ∧>e1( Un): (14)
The learner N outputs the subset index given by sentence (a) for the least index e
that currently quali1es and, otherwise, if no index e quali1es, N signals divergence by
outputting a formula diLerent from the previous one.
Verication. As the formula >ei can be obtained eLectively in i and e, the learner
N is indeed computable. For all e and for i=0; 1, let the set Tei contain exactly the
natural numbers n such that >ei (Un) is true in the standard model. We next show that
if the learner receives any k+1-A-text for a set A then for any index e the following
three conditions are equivalent
(I) the index e quali1es almost always,
(II) the index e quali1es in1nitely often,
(III) the set A and its complement coincide with Te1 and T
e
0 , respectively.
For a proof, 1x any index e. The 1rst condition trivially implies the second one.
If the second condition holds, then Te0 and T
e
1 must be a partition of N because the
formula (b) eventually shows up but no formula of the form (d). Moreover, Te1 is a
subset of A by appearance of (a) and Te0 and A are disjoint by non-appearance of any
formula of the form (c). In summary, this then implies the third condition. Finally,
in case e satis1es the third condition, it is easy to see that the formulae (a) and (b)
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eventually show up but no formula of the form (c) or (d), i.e., the index e quali1es
almost always.
In order to show that N is reliable, 1x any text for a set A. First assume that there
is an index that satis1es the three equivalent conditions (I) through (III) and let e be
the least such index. Then by construction, the learner N converges to formula (a),
which by (III) is indeed a subset index for A. Next assume that no index quali1es
in1nitely often. Then either there are only 1nitely many indices that qualify at all and
N diverges by construction or there are in1nitely many indices that qualify and N
diverges by outputting in1nitely many of them. Finally, N learns C because by the
discussion preceding (12) for any set in C there are formulae as in (12) and hence
with any text for this set some index e will qualify in1nitely often.
Non-learnability from k -A-text. It remains to show that C is not reliably learnable
from k -A-text. In order to do so, we 1x any learner M that is reliable (in the sense
that for any set Y , either M converges on any k -A-text for Y to a subset index for
Y or M diverges on any k -A-text for Y ) and show that there is a ∅k -recursive set
R, i.e., R∈C, such that M does not learn R.
Let 0; 1; : : : be an enumeration of all positive k -A-sentences where, in order to
simplify notation, we assume that 0 is true for all sets. Recall that these sentences
are monotone in the sense that whenever A⊆B and n[A] is true, then so is n[B].
We de1ne inductively for all <∈{0; 1}∗ computable sets A<, B<; C< and corresponding
intervals
I< = {X : A< ⊆ X ⊆ B<}:
The intervals are chosen such that whenever B extends <, then IB is contained in I<.
Moreover, we will ensure for all <,
i[A<] = i[B<] for all i6|<| (15)
and hence, by monotonicity of the i, all sets in I< agree with respect to the predicates
0 through |<|.
The inductive de1nition starts with the interval IC bounded by AC=∅ and BC=N.
Then given A< and B<, in order to de1ne A<0; A<1; B<0 and B<1, we proceed as follows.
• Let n= |<|. Let C< be the union of A< and the set containing every second element
in B<\A<, i.e., if c1; c2; : : : is a strictly ascending enumeration of the elements of
B<\A<, then
C< = A< ∪ {c2; c4; : : :}:
So we have A<⊂C<⊂B< and in this chain of inclusions, any set contains in1nitely
many more numbers than its predecessors.
• Let
(D<; E<) =
{
(C<; B<) in case n[C<] holds;
(A<; C<) otherwise:
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(By monotonicity of n, if the 1rst case applies then n is true for all sets between
C< and B<, if the second case applies then n is false for all sets between A< and
C<. Hence by construction, {X : D<⊆X ⊆E<} is an in1nite subinterval of I< such
that all sets in this interval agree with respect to n.)
• Let x< be the 1rst element in E<\D<. De1ne two in1nite and disjoint subintervals
I<0 and I<1 of I< by letting A<0=D<; B<0=E<\{x<}, and A<1=D<∪{x<}; B<1=E<.
By construction, for all < the sets A<; B< and C< are computable. Furthermore, for any
given <, the inductive de1nition of these sets is computable relative to the oracle ∅k ,
hence with access to this oracle we can compute programs that do not use an oracle
and decide the sets A<; B<, and C<. For a proof it suTces to observe that if we have
already obtained a program that computes C<, then by Remark 4.3 we can compute a
k -A-formula that does not contain the predicate P and which is true if and only if
n[C<] is. Furthermore, the truth value of this formula can be computed relative to the
oracle ∅k .
By construction, for any set F there is a unique set XF that is contained in the
intersection of all classes I< such that < is a pre1x of the characteristic function of F .
If we let
Fn =
{
n if n[X ] for all X ∈ IF(0)F(1):::F(n);
# otherwise (that is; ¬n[X ] for all X ∈ IF(0)F(1):::F(n));
where “#” is the pause symbol, then F0 ; 
F
1 ; : : : is a k -A-text for XF . Note that 
F
n
is just the value of the formula n[C<] where < is equal to F(0)F(1) : : : F(n− 1). For
any < and n = |<| + 1, let t<=F0 F1 : : : Fn , where F is any extension of < and the
actual choice of F does not aLect the value of t<. Then t< can be computed from <
relative to ∅k .
We show now that given any reliable learner M , there is a set F such that F and
XF are both computable relative to oracle ∅k , but M does not learn the set XF . Given
any string <, the learner M cannot learn all of the uncountably many sets XF with
F¡< and so, as M is reliable, we can pick an extension B¡< with M (t<) 	=M (tB).
This way, by successively extending an arbitrary initial string, we obtain a set F and
a text F0 ; 
F
1 ; : : : for XF such that on this text, M changes its mind in1nitely often.
As this search algorithm is computable relative to ∅k , the resulting sequence F and the
set XF are both computable relative to ∅k .
Theorem 8.2. For every k, there is a countable A-axiomatizable class that is limit-
refuting learnable from k+1-A-text but not from k -A-text. In particular, for every
k there is a countable A-axiomatizable class that is not limit-refuting learnable from
k -A-texts.
Proof. Fix any k. A class R as in the theorem can be chosen as a suitable subset of
the class C of all set that are computable relative to oracle ∅k . The proof works by
constructing for any learner Me a set Re∈C that on the one hand witnesses that Me
does not reliably and hence does not limit-refuting learn Re from k -A-text and that
on the other hand can easily be decoded from any k+1-A-text.
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In the proof of Theorem 8.1, for a given reliable learner M we have constructed a
set XF that could not be learned by M from k -A-text. The construction was com-
putable relative to the oracle ∅k+1 and started with an initial interval bounded by AC=∅
and BC=N. Now assume that for given e, we apply this construction to any learner
Me where the initial interval is bounded by AeC={x: x¡e} and BeC={x: x 	=e} (i.e.,
the initial interval contains exactly the sets where the least non-element is e). Then
the construction remains computable relative to oracle ∅k . Furthermore, in case Me is
reliable, we obtain a set that is contained in the interval between AeC and B
e
C and is not
learned by Me. In case Me is not reliable, the construction might get stuck in the sense
that it does not yield the characteristic function of a set but a partial {0; 1}-valued
function. Applying the construction this way to a given index e can be made uniform
in the sense that there is a partial function D with the following properties.
• The partial function D is partial recursive relative to the oracle ∅k .
• For all e, the partial function D(e; :) is de1ned for all arguments less than or equal
to e where
D(e; 0) = 1; : : : ; D(e; e − 1) = 1 and D(e; e) = 0:
In particular, the least non-element of the set Re={x: D(e; x) ↓=1} is e.
• Whenever the learner Me is reliable then D(e; x) is de1ned for all x and the set Re
is not learned by Me from k -A-text.
Then the class C={Re: D(e; :) is total} is A-axiomatizable. Furthermore, the class C
is not reliably learnable and hence not limit-refuting learnable from k -A-text because
for any reliable learner Me, the set Re is in C but by construction Me fails to learn Re
from k -A-text.
It remains to show that C is limit-refuting learnable from k+1-A-text. Fix any
oracle Turing machine that computes D relative to oracle ∅k . Let V contain all tuples
(e; i; x; s) such that on input x, this machine either outputs i within s computation
steps or does not terminate within s computation steps. Then V is computable relative
to oracle ∅k , hence there is a positive k+1-A-formula . that does not contain the
predicate P such that
(e; i; x; s) ∈ V ⇔ .(e; i; x; s):
Fix such a formula . and let
>˜
e
i (x) ≡ (∀s) [.(e; i; x; s)]:
Note that >˜
e
1 (x) is equivalent to x∈Re whenever D(e; :) is total. Since . is a k+1-A-
formula, so are all the formulae >˜
e
i .
Then the following limit-refuting learner N learns all sets Re from k+1-texts. The
learner outputs nothing but refutation symbols as soon as it has seen the formula ∀xPx,
i.e., N correctly limit-refutes the set N. On texts for any other set, we can assume that
in the limit N is able to correctly infer the least non-element of the set to be learned.
Thus it suTces to 1x e and to show that under the assumption that N knows e; N
behaves correctly on the class De of all sets that contain all j¡e but not e.
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Let N output a refutation symbol in case it has seen, for some n, the formulae >˜
e
0 (Un)
and >˜
e
1 (Un). As a consequence, N correctly limit-refutes all sets in De in case D(e; :)
is not total. Otherwise, let N output the formula (e) in (16) as long as N has seen
formula (e) but has not seen any formula of the form (f).
(e) (∀x) [>˜e0(x) ∨ Px]; (f ) >˜
e
0( Un) ∧ P Un: (16)
By D(e; :) being total, it follows that >˜
e
0 (Un) is true iL n =∈Re and hence (e) is a subset
index for Re. As a consequence, N learns the set Re and correctly limit-refutes all other
sets in De. We leave the details of the veri1cation, which is similar to the corresponding
argument in the proof of Theorem 8.1, to the reader.
Recall from Remark 5.4 that in Presburger’s arithmetic augmented with a predicate
for the set Q of square numbers, we can de1ne multiplication. By using this trick, from
Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 on A-axiomatizable classes we easily obtain corresponding, but
slightly weaker results for P-axiomatizable classes.
Corollary 8.3. For any k there is a countable P-axiomatizable class that is limit-
refuting learnable from k+3-P-text but is not reliably learnable from k -P-text.
Proof. We show that for any odd k there is a countable P-axiomatizable classes C′
that is limit-refuting learnable from k+2-P-text but is not reliably learnable from
k -P-text. The separation result for k + 3 versus k for even k is then immediate. So
1x any odd k.
By Theorem 8.2 we can 1x a countable A-axiomatizable class C that can be limit-
refuting learned from k+1-A-text but not from k -A-text. Let Q be the set of square
numbers and for any set A let
AQ = {3n: n ∈ A} ∪ {3n+ 1: n ∈ Q} ∪ {3n+ 2: n =∈ Q}: (17)
We demonstrate that the class CQ={AQ: A∈C} witnesses the assertion of Corollary
8.3. The class CQ is countable because C is. Given an A-sentence 1 that axiomatizes
C, we obtain a P-sentence 0∧′1 that axiomatizes CQ as follows. First, let 0 be a
formula of Presburger’s arithmetic similar to Putnam’s formula in Remark 5.4 that is
true exactly for sets of the form AQ, i.e., for sets that indeed have the set of squares and
its complement encoded in them according to (17). Second, by the technique described
in Remark 5.4 and using a predicate Q for the set of squares, transform the sentence
1 into an equivalent sentence over the language P∪{Q}. Obtain ′1 by replacing
in the new sentence each subformula P(t) and Qt; t a term, by P(t + t + t) and by
P(t + t + t + U1), respectively. Then, by construction, for any set A the formula 1 is
true in M(A) if and only if ′1 is true in M(AQ). In summary, the P-sentence 0∧′1
axiomatizes the class CQ because its 1rst conjunct is true exactly for sets of the form
AQ, while for any set of this form the second conjunct is true if and only if A is in
C, i.e., if AQ is in CQ.
Next we show that given a learner M that limit-refuting learns the class C from
k+1-A-text we can construct a learner MQ that limit-refuting learns the class CQ
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from k+2-P-text. For any positive k+1-A-formula . there is a positive k+2-P-
formula .Q such that for any set A the original formula . is true in M(A) if and only
if .Q is true in M(AQ). Again, 1rst we transform . into an equivalent P∪{Q}-formula
and then, second, in order to obtain the formula .Q, for any term t and any subformula
of one of the following forms, we replace in the formula obtained in the 1rst step
Pt by P(t + t + t);
Qt by P(t + t + t + 1);
¬Qt by P(t + t + t + 2): (18)
The 1rst transformation changes the matrix of the formula . into a 02-formula while
the second transformation does not add any quanti1ers, so the original k+1-formula
. is changed into the k+2-formula .Q. Now any k+2-P-text for a set of the form
AQ contains the formulae .Q for all k+1-A-formulae . that are true in M(A). Thus
on any such text, the learner MQ can recover a k+2-A-text for the set A and, by
simulating M on the latter text, can correctly learn or limit-refute any set of the form
AQ. Furthermore, the learner MQ limit-refutes any set that is not of the form AQ if we
require in addition that MQ outputs a refutation symbol as long as it has not seen the
formula (∀x) [P(x + x + x + U1) ∨ P(x + x + x + U2)] and as soon it has seen a formula
P(3d+ 1) for a non-square d or a formula P(3d+ 2) for a square d. As a consequence,
the learner MQ limit-refuting learns the class CQ.
Finally, in order to show that the class CQ cannot be reliably learned from k -P-
text, we argue that any k -A-text for a set A can be eLectively transformed into a
k -P-text for the set AQ. Then if there were a learner NQ that limit-refuting learns
CQ from k -P-text, contrary to assumption we could construct a learner N that limit-
refuting learns the class C from k -A-text. By de1nition, A is in C if and only if AQ
is in CQ, hence the learner N can simply transform any given text for a set A into a
k -P-text for AQ, then simulating NQ on the new text.
In order to obtain a transformation of k -A-texts into k -P-texts as required, we
show that there is a computable transformation 3 →3′ from k -P-sentences to k -A-
sentences such that positive sentences are mapped to positive sentences and for any
set X and any 3, the truth values of 3[XQ] and 3′[X ] are the same. The translation of
texts, which goes in the reverse direction, then can be done by enumerating all positive
k -P-sentences 3 and placing exactly those 3 into the k -P-text for AQ where 3′
eventually occurs in the given k -A-text for A. Note that the same transformation can
be used to transform the indices output by the simulated k -P-learner NQ for CQ into
indices of the A-learner N for C.
The transformation from 3 to 3′ works by picking two variables x1 and x2 that do
not appear in 3, then replacing in 3 every subformula of the form Pt; t a term, by
the formula
(∀x1; x2) [( U3 · x1 	= t ∨ Px1)
∧( U3 · x1 + U1 	= t ∨ (x1 6 x2 · x2 ∨ (x2 + U1) · (x2 + U1)6 x1))
∧( U3 · x1 + U2 	= t ∨ x1 	= x2 · x2)];
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while leaving the formula 3 unchanged otherwise. The subformula substituted for Pt
expresses that x1∈A if t=3x1, that x1 is a square (i.e., is not contained in the open
interval bounded by two adjacent squares (x2)2 and (x2 +1)2) if t=3x1 +1 and that x1
is not equal to any square (x2)2 if t=3x1 +2. By construction, the mapping from 3 to
3′ preserves truth values as required and maps positive sentences to positive sentences.
Furthermore, since k is odd, in case 3 is a k -sentence, its last quanti1er is universal
or there are less than k−1 alternations of quanti1ers, hence 3′ is again a k -sentence.
The transformation from 3 to 3′ completes the reduction of the problem of learning
C from k -A-texts to the problem of learning CQ from k -P-texts. Since C cannot be
learned reliably from k -A-texts, a corresponding assertion on non-learnability holds
for CQ.
Remark 8.4. We conjecture that the separation in Corollary 8.3 can be sharpened to the
assertion that for any k, there is a countable P-axiomatizable class that is limit-refuting
learnable from k+1-P-text but is not reliably learnable from k -P-text.
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